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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: ] 
IN THE ' ?ER OF THE ESTATE OF ] 
GORDON JJ HAMILTON, DECEASED. ] 
MARY M. HAMILTON, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
STUART HAMILTON AND VINCENT 
HAMILTON, 
Petitioners. 
i Case No. 930065-CA 
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
When the intent is clear that Gordon Dean Hamilton, 
hereinafter "Gordon," intended to grant to Mary Hamilton, 
hereinafter "Mary#" a life estate in Gordon's home, but there is no 
deed wherein Gordon conveyed to Mary a life estate, and Gordon, in 
his Last Will and Testament, states that he has made provisions 
outside of the Will for Mary, and Mary is not devised any property 
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under the Will, is the clear intent of Gordon sufficient, without 
any words of grant or devise, to convey a life estate? 
Does the gifting, each to the other, of the four bronzes, 
create a joint tenancy estate in the four bronzes in favor of Mary? 
OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals, on February 11, 1994, filed its 
opinion, which opinion is annexed in the Appendix in full, wherein 
the Court of Appeals found at pages 5 and 6 of the opinion: 
In the case at bar, Gordon Hamilton's intent 
is plainly revealed in the language of 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the will. Paragraph 3 
provides: "It is my intent to leave a life 
estate to my wife Mary M. Hamilton in the 
residence we have in Springville, Utah." 
Paragraph 4 states that his children's rights 
to the marital home are "subject to a life 
estate my wife Mary M. Hamilton who [sic] 
shall have unless she remarries." 
Additionally, the language of section IV of 
the antenuptial agreement states: "In the 
event, however, that Gordon predeceases Mary, 
it is the intent of the parties that she be 
given a life estate in the residence and 
building lot so long as she does not cohabit 
therein with any other person." Thus, even 
though the will does not contain specific 
granting language, strict construction must 
yield to Gordon Hamilton's intent, which is 
apparent from the language quoted above. 
Accordingly, the trial court's finding that 
Gordon Hamilton granted Mary Hamilton a life 
estate provided that she not remarry or 
cohabit with anyone in the marital home is not 
clearly erroneous. 
At pages 7 and 8 of the opinion, the Court of Appeals found: 
As to the four bronzes, both Mary Hamilton and 
the Hamiltons' neighbors, Richard and Sandra 
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Tretheway, testified that Gordon and Mary 
Hamilton had given the four bronzes to each 
other as a Christmas gift, and Stuart and 
Vincent Hamilton have failed to marshal any 
evidence to the contrary. Thus, we must 
assume the record supports the trial court's 
finding that Mary Hamilton is entitled to a 
joint tenancy interest in the four bronzes, 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 
1992), and therefore conclude that such 
finding is not clearly erroneous. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is being made 
pursuant to Rules 45 and 47(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
A. The Court of Appeals filed for entry its 
decision on February 11, 1994. 
B. No request for rehearing was filed by either 
party. 
C. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is found in 
S 78-2-2(3)(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
The controlling statutes necessary for a determination of 
the question presented for review are: 
Sections 25-5-1 and 25-5-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
The trial court, the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, 
sitting without a jury, heard the matter on October 15 and 16, 
1991, and entered its Memorandum Decision on December 11, 1991. 
Petitioners, the personal representatives, made a Motion 
to Amend, to Make Additional Findings, for a New Trial and the 
Insufficiency of Evidence to Support the Memorandum Decision on 
December 19, 1991. 
Mary filed Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, together with a Proposed Judgment on January 22, 1992. 
Petitioners filed an Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Proposed Judgment on February 6, 1992. 
On February 7, 1992, Petitioners filed a Motion to Strike. 
Mary filed a Motion to Amend the Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment on April 13, 1992. The 
trial court heard all post trial motions on April 17, 1992, and 
entered its ruling and signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, together with the Judgment on May 6, 1992. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 3, 1992, appealing 
the final Judgment of May 6, 1992. 
This Court assigned the case to the Court of Appeals 
under § 78-2-2(4) and S 78-2a-3(2) (k). The matter was argued 
before the Court of Appeals before Judges Russon, Billings and 
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Greenwood on November 16, 1993, and the Court of Appeals rendered 
its decision on February 11, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Gordon Dean Hamilton, deceased, hereinafter "Gordon," 
married Mary Hamilton, hereinafter "Mary," on September 26, 1986. 
Prior to the marriage, the parties entered into an Antenuptial 
Agreement. (Mary Transcript, p. 2.) The effect of the Antenuptial 
Agreement allowed each party to retain ownership of the property 
which each owned prior to the marriage. (Exhibit 2.) The 
Antenuptial Agreement further expressed Gordon's future desire of 
granting a life estate in Gordon's home by the following language 
found in Section IV: 
It is the intent of the parties to dwell at 
the residence located at 1907 Spring Oaks 
Drive, Springville, Utah. Said residence and 
the building lot upon which it is situated 
shall remain titled in the name of the 
respective husband. In the event, however, 
that Gordon predeceases Mary, it is the intent 
of the parties that she be given a life estate 
in the residence and building lot so long as 
she does not cohabit therein with any other 
person. 
Gordon ratified the Antenuptial Agreement in his Last Will and 
Testament executed on December 7, 1989. (Exhibit 1.) On January 
17, 1990, Gordon died. 
In the Will, Gordon stated: 
I, Gordon D. Hamilton, of Springville, Utah 
County, State of Utah, declare this to be my 
last will and hereby revoke any earlier wills 
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and codicils. I declare that I am a married 
man. I state that I was married to Marie 
Hamilton and had as issue of that marriage my 
5 children. I divorced Marie Hamilton who is 
not to take under this will. I married Lola 
Shurtleff Hamilton and we had no children of 
that marriage and she is not to take under 
this will. I then married Mary M. Hamilton, 
my present wife who is to be mentioned in this 
will and is subject to a prenuptial agreement 
which I hereby ratify. I have tried to make 
the transfers to Mary Hamilton outside of this 
will in the form of life insurance policies 
and a life estate in the house, no children 
have been born as issue of said marriage to 
Mary Hamilton. (emphasis supplied) 
In paragraph 3 of the Will, Gordon stated: 
It is my intent to leave a life estate to my 
wife Mary A. Hamilton in the residence we have 
in Springville, Utah. 
Then the Will proceeds to actually give to the five children the 
properties by the following language: 
I give to my children all my personal and 
household property . . . . (paragraph 3.1) 
I give to mv children any interest which I may 
own in any single family residential property 
which I shall be using as a primary or 
secondary residence at the time of my death 
subject to a life estate my wife Mary M. 
Hamilton who shall have unless she remarries, 
(emphasis supplied) (paragraph 4) 
I give my residuary estate as follows . . . . 
(paragraph 5) 
There are no other documents other than the Antenuptial 
Agreement and the Will. 
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Subsequent to the marriage, Gordon either personally or 
through Hamilton Brothers Electric, Inc., purchased numerous other 
items of personal property. (See Exhibit 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10# 11, 
12, 14; Mary Transcript, pp. 3, 8, 9, 3, 14, 15, 23, 27.) Mary 
made a claim by way of gift to her and Gordon, from each other, of 
four bronzes. (See Mary Transcript, pp. 19, 22, 23, 117.) The 
four bronzes consisted of the Stage Coach, the Caba, the Little Boy 
and the Little Girl. (See Mary Transcript, p. 19.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GORDON DEAN HAMILTON DID NOT CREATE 
A LIFE ESTATE IN THE HOME AND 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
EFFECTIVELY OVERRULES THE CASE LAW 
OF THE SUPREME COURT. 
There is no question that Gordon intended to grant a life 
estate to Mary in the home. Both the Will and the Antenuptial 
Agreement memorializes that intent. In the Antenuptial Agreement, 
Section IV, the following language appears: 
It is the intent of the parties to dwell at 
the residence located at 1907 Spring Oaks 
Drive, Springville, Utah. Said residence and 
the building lot upon which it is situated 
shall remain titled in the name of the 
respective husband. In the event, however, 
that Gordon predeceases Mary, it is the intent 
of the parties that she be given a life estate 
in the residence and building lot so long as 
she does not cohabit therein with any other 
person. (emphasis supplied) 
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The language used does not effectuate the granting of a life 
estate, but merely expresses the intent to grant a life estate 
sometime in the future. 
The Will is equally defective in granting a life estate, 
but does express the intent of Gordon by the following language in 
the introductory paragraph of the Will: 
I, Gordon D. Hamilton, of Springville, Utah 
County, State of Utah, declare this to be my 
last will and hereby revoke any earlier wills 
and codicils. I declare that I am a married 
man. I state that I was married to Marie 
Hamilton and had as issue of that marriage my 
5 children. I divorced Marie Hamilton who is 
not to take under this will. I married Lola 
Shurtleff Hamilton and we had no children of 
that marriage and she is not to take under 
this will. I then married Mary M. Hamilton, 
my present wife who is to be mentioned in this 
will and is subject to a prenuptial agreement 
which I hereby ratify. I have tried to make 
the transfers to Mary Hamilton outside of this 
will in the form of life insurance policies 
and a life estate in the house, no children 
have been born as issue of said marriage to 
Mary Hamilton. (emphasis supplied) 
In paragraph 3 of the Will, Gordon stated: 
It is my intent to leave a life estate to my 
wife Mary A. Hamilton in the residence we have 
in Springville, Utah. 
Then the Will proceeds to actually give to the five children all of 
the properties by the following language: 
I give to my children all my personal and 
household property . . . . (paragraph 3.1) 
I give to my children . . . . (paragraph 4) 
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I give my residuary estate as follows . . . . 
(paragraph 5) 
The contrast of the expression of intent versus the actual giving 
is readily apparent. Gordon has expressed his intent to leave a 
life estate to Mary, but has not made the actual gift, devise or 
deed granting the same. 
One other provision of the Will mentions the life estate. 
It is found in paragraph 4 wherein Mr. Hamilton devises to his five 
children the remainder by the following language: 
I give to mv children any interest which I may 
own in any single family residential property 
which I shall be using as a primary or 
secondary residence at the time of my death 
subject to a life estate my wife Mary M. 
Hamilton who shall have unless she remarries, 
(emphasis supplied) 
The foregoing is a devise of the remainder to the five children and 
simply describes the remainder. It is not a devise to Mary. There 
is no bequest to Mary in the Will. There is no deed granting a 
life estate to Mary. Gordon stated ". . . I have tried to make 
transfers outside of this Will in the form of life insurance 
policies and a life estate in the house . . . ." His intent is 
clear, his execution of that intent is non-existent. 
An interest in real property, the purported life estate, 
must be created by a writing subscribed to by Gordon. The 
provisions of S 25-5-1, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides in 
pertinent part: 
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No estate or interest in real property . . . 
shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act 
or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance 
in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring 
the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing. 
There is an exception for a decedent under a Will to transfer real 
property under § 25-5-2, which provides in pertinent part: 
The next preceding section [25-5-1] shall not 
be construed to affect the power of a testator 
in the disposition of his real estate by last 
will and testament . . . . 
The only two written documents that exist to create or effectuate 
the life estate are the Antenuptial Agreement and the Will. 
Neither instrument actually grants a life estate to Mary. 
Even the Court of Appeals acknowledges that the Will does 
not devise Mary a life estate. At page 6, the Appeals Court 
declared: 
Thus, even though the will does not contain 
specific granting language, strict 
construction must yield to Gordon Hamilton's 
intent, which is apparent from the language 
quoted above. 
This Court has consistently held that the interpretation 
of an unambiguous agreement is a matter of law and that no 
deference is to be given to the trial court. In Hartman v. Potter, 
596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979), this court declared at page 656: 
In the absence of ambiguity, the construction 
of deeds is a question of law for the court, 
and the main object in construing a deed is to 
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ascertain the intention of the parties, 
especially that of the grantor, from the 
language used. The description of the 
property in a deed is prima facie an 
expression of the intention of the grantor and 
the term "intention," as applied to the 
construction of a deed, is to be distinguished 
from its usual connotation. When so applied, 
it is a term of art and signifies a meaning of 
the writing. 
Deeds are to be construed like other written 
instruments, and where a deed is plain and 
unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible 
to vary its terms. It is the court's duty to 
construe a deed as it is written, and in the 
final analysis, each instrument must be 
construed in the light of its own language and 
peculiar facts. It is also well known that 
the intention of the parties to a conveyance 
is open to interpretation only when the words 
used are ambiguous. 
Where the issue involved is solely one of law, 
as in the instant case, this Court is capable 
of determining the question as was the trial 
court and we are not bound by its conclusions, 
(emphasis by the Court) 
The clear intent of Gordon cannot be a substitute for 
words of grant. See 23 Am. Jur. 2d § 19 Deeds, p. 91: 
In order to transfer title, an instrument must 
contain apt words of grant which manifest the 
grantor's intent to make a present conveyance 
of the land by his deed, as distinguished from 
an intention to convey it at some future time. 
The absence of words of conveyance cannot be 
supplied, and if no words importing a grant 
can be found in the deed, it is void although 
in other respects formal and regular. 
The language ". . . it is the intent of the parties that she be 
given a life estate . . ."is not a present conveyance. 
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The plain and concise language of the Will did not convey 
a life estate to Mary. As stated in LDS Hospital v. Capitol Life 
Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 857 (Ut. 1988), page 858: 
. . . [A] cardinal rule in construing the 
contract is to give effect to the intentions 
of the parties and, if possible, these 
intentions should be gleaned from an 
examination of the text of the contract 
itself. 
This position is further supported by the Court of Appeals case of 
Crowther v. Carter, 767 p.2d 129 (Ut. App. 1989), page 132, where 
the Court said: 
But it is not the function of a court to 
rewrite an unambiguous contract. Provo City 
Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 802 (Utah 
1979). 
A recent Texas case, involving the interpretation of a 
deed, Prairie Producing Co. v. Schlachter, 786 S.W. 2d 409 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1990) expressed the question, at page 412: 
In interpreting a deed we must ascertain and 
enforce the intention of the parties. . . . 
However, the controlling intention is not the 
subjective intention the parties may have had 
but failed to express, but the intention 
actually expressed in the deed; that is, the 
question is not what the parties meant to say, 
but the meaning of what they did say* 
(citations omitted) (emphasis supplied) 
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, at pages 5 and 6 declared: 
In the case at bar, Gordon Hamilton's intent 
is plainly revealed in the language of 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the will. Paragraph 3 
provides: "It is my intent to leave a life 
estate to my wife Mary M. Hamilton in the 
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residence we have in Springville, Utah." 
Paragraph 4 states that his children's rights 
to the marital home are "subject to a life 
estate my wife Mary M. Hamilton who [sic] 
shall have unless she remarries." 
Additionally, the language of section IV of 
the antenuptial agreement states: "In the 
event, however, that Gordon predeceases Mary, 
it is the intent of the parties that she be 
given a life estate in the residence and 
uilding lot so long as she does not cohabit 
lerein with any other person." Thus, even 
.hough the will does not contain specific 
granting language, strict construction must 
yield to Gordon Hamilton's intent, which is 
apparent from the language quoted above. 
Accordingly, the trial court's finding that 
Gordon Hamilton granted Mary Hamilton a life 
estate provided that she not remarry or 
cohabit with anyone in the marital home is not 
clearly erroneous. 
The Court of Appeals applied the "clearly erroneous" 
standard when it is the interpretation of an unambiguous document, 
which is a matter of law and no particular deference should be 
given to the trial court. 
Second, the Court of Appeals effectively "... [rewrote] 
an unambiguous contract" by rewriting Gordon's Will through the 
guise of giving effect to Gordon's intent but not the meaning of 
what was actually said. THE NET EFFECT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS1 
DECISION IS TO NEGATE (A) THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN RE DEEDS AND 
WILLS, (B) REWRITING OF A WILL, and (C) THE OVERRULING OF THIS 
COURT'S PRIOR DECISIONS IN RE: (1) STANDARD OF REVIEW (clearly 
erroneous v. matter of law) and (2) ADDING WORDS OF GRANT WHEN NONE 
ARE PRESENT (rewriting a contract through interpretation). 
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Further# a Writ of Certiorari should be granted to have 
this Court consider the question of whether clear intent is 
sufficient, absent words of grant to convey an interest in real 
property. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD IS TOTALLY DEVOID OF EVIDENCE 
OF ANY JOINT TENANCY AGREEMENT AND THE GIVING 
TO EACH OTHER FODR BRONZES DOES NOT EQUATE 
TO THE CREATION OF JOINT TENANCY. 
Petitioners did not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence that the four bronzes were given by Gordon to each other 
as Christmas gifts. The giving to each other of the four bronzes, 
however, does not create a joint tenancy estate in the four 
bronzes. It creates a tenancy in common. There is absolutely no 
testimony in the entire record about joint tenancy. The terms of 
the Antenuptial Agreement are in force and effect, which provides 
that whatever Gordon received by gift is Gordon's and does not 
belong to Mary. 
Mary argued that the bronze statuary of the "Stagecoach," 
the "Caba," the "Little Boy" and the "Little Girl" were owned as 
joint property, not to be confused as joint tenancy property, as a 
result of gifts between Mary and Gordon. (Brief of Appellee, p. 
22-24.) "We decided that we [Mary and Gordon] would buy those 
[bronzes] and give them to each other as presents, Christmas 
presents, birthdays, whatever." (Mary Transcript, p. 20.) 
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Further, Mary states the four bronzes were not solely a gift to 
her, but a gift to both Mary and Gordon Hamilton and that she 
claimed no further interest in any of the other bronzes. (Mary 
Transcript, pp. 22-23.) Mary, in her brief, further supports the 
proposition that the four bronzes were a joint gift with the 
testimony of Richard and Sandra Tretheway. (See Brief of Mary, p. 
22-23.) In the absence of proof of actual ownership, property in 
the marital home is presumed to be held in tenancy in common, half 
by the husband, half by the wife. Estate of Gorrell, 765 P.2d 878, 
879 (Utah 1988). See also Remington v. Landolt, 541 P.2d 472 (Or. 
1975), wherein the Oregon court held that husbands and wives do not 
own personal property as tenants by the entirety or, in absence of 
a special agreement, as joint tenants; instead, ownership of 
husband and wife in personal property is ordinarily by tenancy in 
common• 
The Court of Appeals, at pages 7 and 8, stated: 
As to the four bronzes, both Mary Hamilton and 
the Hamiltons' neighbors, Richard and Sandra 
Tretheway, testified that Gordon and Mary 
Hamilton had given the four bronzes to each 
other as a Christmas gift, and Stuart and 
Vincent Hamilton have failed to marshal any 
evidence to the contrary. Thus, we must 
assume the record supports the trial court's 
finding that Mary Hamilton is entitled to a 
joint tenancy interest in the four bronzes, 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 
1992), and therefore conclude that such 
finding is not clearly erroneous. 
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The Court of Appeals decision attempts to overrule this Court's 
decision in Gorrell, supra, and ignores the marshalling of the lack 
of evidence, which is non-existent, about joint tenancy. NO 
EVIDENCE WAS EVER SUBMITTED BY ANY PARTY ABOUT JOINT TENANCY. THE 
ONLY REFERENCE ABOUT JOINT TENANCY WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
CONCLUSIONS (Pages 208 and 210 of the record), WHICH CONCLUSIONS 
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners seek a Writ of Certiorari to determine the 
Questions for Review inasmuch as the decision of the Court of 
Appeals effectively negates the statute of frauds, and overrules 
existing case law and decisions by this Court. Further, there is 
a substantial question of whether the clear intent, per se, is 
sufficient, absent words of grant, to convey a life estate under 
Utah law. 
DATED this /& day of March, 1994. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of March, 1994, I 
caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI to be served by first-class United States mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Dallas H. Young, Jr. 
IVIE & YOUNG _ _ _ 
48 North University Ave. 
P.O. Box 612 
Provo, Utafc-84603 
jrbpl836 
APPENDIX A 
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT 
^^Antenuptial property agreement made this ££ day of 
<^<5frJ*<r , 1986, between Gordon D. Hamilton of Springville, 
Utah OXintyf State of Utah, and Mary M. Allman of Springville, 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
This agreement is made in consideration of the con-
templated marriage of the parties hereto. This Antenuptial 
Agreement supercedes and replaces in its entirety that certain 
Antenuptial Agreement previously executed by the parties on 
the 16th day of September, 1986. The parties hereto acknowledge 
that said agreement hereto has been executed prior to the mar-
riage which is contemplated for r^>?/ p ^ , XSQa. /c^'P/:3^\^/[ 
SECTION I 
PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES 
Each party to this agreement owns property as follows: 
A. Gordon D. Hamilton owns real property described as 
follows: 
Estimated 
Description Location Value 
Residence and real Spring Oaks Drive $380f000.00 
property Springville, UT 
Business property South State Street 325,000.00 
leased to Hamilton Eros. Springville, UT 
Electric, Inc. 
one-acre lot Vicinity Spanish 50,000.00 
Fork airport 
3 building lots Adjoining Springville 15,000.00 
residence ea. total 
Spring 0::_ Drive 45,000.00 
3 acres pasture ground South Springville 
B. The parties each own personal property yhich shall 
remain their individual property. 
SECTION II 
CHILDREN BY PRIOR MARRIAGES 
Each of the parties has children from a previous marriaqe, 
all of which have attained the age of majority. 
SECTION III 
INTENT OF PARTIES 
A. The parties hereto have the intent and desire to 
define and set forth the respective rights of each in the pro-
perty of the other after their marriage. 
B. The parties intend and desire that all property 
owned respectively by each of them at the time of their 
marriage, and all property that may be acquired by each of 
them from any source during their marriage, shall be respec-
tively their separate property except as otherwise provided 
herein. 
SECTION IV 
REAL PROPERTY 
It is the intent of the parties to dwell at the resi-
dence located at 1907 Spring Oaks Drive, Springville, Utah. 
Said residence and the building lot upon which it is situ-
ated shall remain titled in the name of the respective hus-
band. In the event, however, that Gordon predeceases Mary, 
it is the intent of the parties that she be given a life 
estate in the residence and building lot so long as she does 
not cohabit therein with any other person. * 
In the event the parties relocate the marital residence, 
it is the intention of the parties that the life estate pro-
vided for Mary shall be in whatever marital residence is oc-
cupied at the time Gordon becomes deceased, so long as she 
does not cohabit therein with any other person. 
SECTION V 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
It is understood by the parties hereto that Gordon D. 
Hamilton owns all stock in Hamilton Brothers Electric, Inc. 
Said stock is to remain his sole and separate property, and 
he may disburse as he sees fit to his children or any other 
persons whatsoever. In addition thereto, Hamilton Brothers 
Electric, Inc. o^ which Gordon is the sole stockholder, owns 
various other it s of personal property as assets of the 
corporation. It .3 clearly understood by the parties that 
such assets shalj. remain so owned and titled. 
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SECTION VI 
LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES 
A. The parites acknowledge that the respective husband 
has life insurance policies presently designating his children 
of a prior marriage as beneficiaries. It is not the inten-
tion-,^ the parties to modify sadld schedule, but the parties 
may consider the acquisition of additipnal term insurance 
designating prospective wife as beneficiary. 
SECTION VII 
STATUS OF PROPERTY 
All real and personal property owned by either of the 
parites at the time of their marriage, and all real and per-
sonal property that either may acquire from any source what-
soever during their marriage, shall be their respective sep-
arate property, except if unless specifically otherwise desig-
nated at the time of acquisition thereof, or other individual 
separate agreement of the parties. 
SECTION VIII 
LIABILITY OF DEBTS 
The debts contracted by each party hereto prior to their 
marriage are to be paid by the party who shall have contracted 
the same, and the property of the other party shall not in any 
respect be liable for payment thereof. 
SECTION IX 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
This agreement shall take effect on the date the mar-
riage contemplated by the P£x£ries~has been solemnized under 
the laws of the State of M,&^ • 
SECTION X 
The parties hereto stipulate that they have read this 
agreement and have had its contents explained to them and each 
of them fully understand the terms, provisions, and legal con-
sequences of this agreement and execute it freely and volun-
tarily. 
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This agreement has been signed the date and month first 
above written. 
^ . < £ ^ //.•"><&»"'*••**•* 
ON D. HAMILTON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss, 
WOltt k. ALLMAN 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On the pL day of September, 1986, personally appeared 
before me, Gordon D. Hamilton, who duly acknowledged to me that 
he executed the above documentation. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: /£-J/-<f? 
A WV 
Residing at: ^.\JiH) L/^ • 
nojt>(<,„,J yhjuuLJJux^ 
STATE OF U1AH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On the £t day of September, 1986, personally appeared 
before me, Mary M. Allraan, who duly acknowledged to me that 
she executed the above documentation. 
u 
NOTARY PUBLIC (j 
My Commission Expires: /C'Sf'S7 
Residing at: (tMjH.lJ^ 
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APPENDIX B 
^ i n i r . \j] u | / I H 
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Saist Hil l an& SfeatamEttt 
OF 
GORDON D. HAMILTON 
1/ Gordon D. Hamilton, of Springville, Utah County/ State of 
Utah, declare this to be my last wLll and hereby revoke any 
earlier wills and codicils. I declare that I am a married man. 
I state that I was married to Marie Hamilton and had as issue of 
that marriage my 5 children. I divorced Marie Hamilton who is 
not to take under this will. I married Lola Shurtleff Hamilton 
and we had no children of that marriage and she is not to take 
under this will. I then married Mary M. Hamilton/ my present 
wife who is to be mentioned in this will and is subject to a 
prenuptial agreement which I hereby ratify. I have tried to make 
the transfers to Mary Hamilton outside of this will in the form 
of life insurance policies and a life estate in the house/ no 
children have been born of issue of said marri.age to Mary 
Hamilton. 
1. I appoint Stuart G. Hamilton and Vincent C. Hamilton as 
my personal co-representatives. My personal representatives 
shall be as free and independent of court supervision as the law 
shall allow. My estate shall have all the advantages of informal 
administration and I direct that no other action be had in the 
probate court in relation to the settlement of my estate nan 
that minimally required by law, unless my personal 
representatives deem more formal administration to be 
advantageous to my estate. The judgment of my personal 
representatives in such matters shall be conclusive/ except as 
may be otherwise provided by law. 
No bond or other security shall ever be required of my 
personal representatives or their successor. If despite my 
directions, a bond is required by law, insofar as it lies within 
my power/ I direct that no surety be required on such bond. 
2. In determining beneficiaries of this will or trusts 
created herein/ a beneficiary shall be deemed to have survived 
me, any other person, a point in time, or an event, as the case 
may be, only if such survivorship is for a period of thirty (30) 
days. Provided, however, the preceding sentence shall not apply 
in any case where its application would cause any otherwise valid 
provision of this will to be void under the rule against 
perpetuities or any similar rule. 
3. It is my intent that my property except for those items 
listed on deeds and life insurance policies be divided among my 
five children, share and share alike, per stirpes. I realize 
that there are some difficulties with making the shares equal and 
that the shares will be entirely dependant upon the wants and 
desires of the children. I realize that there will have to be 
some nogotiation between my children to make the shares equal 
particularly in view of the fact that the corporation would not 
involve all heirs and the house would probably not involve all 
heirs. It is my intent to leave-a life estate to my wife Mary M. 
Hamilton in the residence we have in Springville, Utah. 
3.1. I give to my children all my personal and household 
effects of a tangible personal property nature, such as jewelry, 
clothing, furniture, silver, books, and pictures and my 
automobiles to be divided among my issue in equal shares by my 
personal representative on a substantially per stirpes basis. 
Any tangible personal property of a business or investment nature 
shall not be governed by this paragraph but shall be part of my 
residuary estate. 
4. I give to my children any interest which I may own in 
any single family residential property which I shall be using as 
a primary or secondary residence at the time of my death subject 
to a life estate my wife Mary M. Hamilton who shall have unless 
she remarries. Note that I do not intend by this paragraph to 
override any joint tenancy which may exist in such property 
5. My residuary estate shall include all real and personal 
property^ including my business whether community or separate and 
wherever situated/ which I may own at my death (excluding 
property over which I may have a power of appointment) and which 
I have not disposed of by other paragraphs of this will. I give 
my residuary estate as follows: 
5.1 My unsecured debts/ secured debts/ administration 
expenses/ funeral expenses/ and all federal and state estate and 
inheritance taxes shall be paid out of my residuary estate. Any 
taxes owed or incurred before my death shall be treated as a debt 
of my estate for all purposes. Provided/ however/ my personal 
representative shall have the power to determine whether or not 
any or all of my secured debts shall be paid (including debts 
secured by property passing by joint tenancy) and thus exonerate 
certain property from debts. Hence/ my personal representative 
may pay secured debts/ may obtain renewals of secured debts/ may 
distribute such property subject to such debts/ or may distribute 
such property with the distributees assuming such debts. I 
specifically direct that if prior to my death I gave/ sold, 
exchanged/ or otherwise transferred any property in such a manner 
as to demonstrate an intention that the transferee thereof would 
be the ultimate payor of any debtsecured thereby (whether the 
transferee assumed the debt or merely took subject thereto), then 
said debt shall not be borne by my estate/ but shall be borne by 
the transferee; but if said transferee fails to pay the debt and 
my estate must pay the same, then said deb*" ^11 be paid from my 
residuary estate and my executor shall proceed to recover the 
payment from the transferee. Provided further, it is my 
intention that all nonprobate property creating a federal or 
state estate or inheritance tax burden upon my estate will share 
proportionately with my residuary estate the respective burden of 
such taxes. Therefore, I direct that any of the hereinbefore 
described taxes payable by reason of the taxability of any gifts 
in contemplation of death, retained life estates, transfers 
taking effect at death, revocable transfers, annuities, joint 
tenancies, powers of appointment, life insurance proceeds, or 
other nonprobate a s s e t s sha l l be paid by the r e c i p i e n t of such 
a s s e t s and t h a t any of such t a x e s p a y a b l e b e c a u s e o f the 
t a x a b i l i t y of any part o£ my residuary e s t a t e s h a l l be paid out 
of my residuary e s t a t e / subject to two e x c e p t i o n s : (1) The 
r e c i p i e n t s of l i f e insurance proceeds and power of appointment 
proper ty s h a l l pay t h e i r share of f e d e r a l e s t a t e t a x e s a s 
provided by federal law. (2) None of the hereinbefore described 
taxes s h a l l be borne by my wife with respec t to any probate or 
nonprobate a s s e t s passing to her and qua l i fy ing for the federal 
e s t a t e tax marital deduction. 
5.2 The remainder of my residuary s h a l l be d iv ided equal ly 
among my f i v e chi ldren per s t i r p e s shares . 
6 . My personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , in addi t ion to the powers 
that may be provided by law, s h a l l have the power to s e l l and 
exchange property/ real or personal / for cash or on time/ with or 
w i thout an order of the c o u r t / a s such t i m e s and upon such 
condi t ions as sha l l be deemed a d v i s a b l e ; and the purchaser sha l l 
have no duty to fol low the proceeds' of the s a l e . My p e r s o n a l 
representat ive sha l l have the power to postpone for a reasonable 
time such part of the f i n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of my e s t a t e as i s 
reasonable in l i g h t of tax a u d i t s / l aw su i t s / disputed c la ims , or 
s imi lar matters remaining unresolved. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of the 
whole of any part of my e s t a t e , except as to g i f t s of s p e c i a l 
property/ may be made in cash or in kind/ or par t ly in cash and 
p a r t l y i n k i n d / a s my p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a l l deem 
a d v i s a b l e . 
7 . As used in t h i s w i l l , "my wi fe" s h a l l mean Mary M. 
Hamilton. "My children" sha l l mean Stuart G. Hamilton, Vincent 
C. Hami l ton / Amber Hamilton McKelvey/ Lisa Hami l ton , Tonua 
Hamilton/ and any other ch i ld of mine born a f t e r the date of th i s 
w i l l . 
1/ GORDON D. HAMILTON, the t e s t a t o r , s ign my name .to t h i s 
instrument t h i s y*& day of / ^ ^ ^ , 1989/ and being 
f i r s t duly sworn/ do hereby declare to "the undersigned author i ty 
that I s ign and e x e c u t e t h i s in s t rument a s my l a s t w i l l and 
testament and that I sign i t w i l l i n g l y , that I execute i t as 
my free and voluntary act for the purposes expressed in i t , and 
that I am 18 years of age or o l d e r , of sound mind, and under no 
cons tra in t of undue in f luence . 
We , ffltAlu: C/iQAlA; 
the witnesses/ sign our names to this instrument/ bein^/ first 
duly sworn/ and do hereby declare to the undersigned authority 
that the testator signs and executes this instrument as his last 
will and that he signs it willingly, and that each of us, in the 
presence and hearing of testator and of each other/ hereby signs 
this will as witness to the testator's signing, and that to the 
best of our knowledge the testator is 18 years of age or older, 
of sound mind and under no constraint or undue influence. 
i<£* 
WITNESS 
<%M/' CAM(A A-
WITNESS 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
3S. 
Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me by GORDON 
D. HAMILTON, the testator, and subscribed and sworn to before me 
°y -Shorn' Cdldtr and p ^ £. Sfrarva , the 
w i t n e s s e s , t h i s -~7tb day of <X>/V r^Ahr>T / 1939. 
C # £ 3 * ^ > N . 
J^^ff^I elites: 
a#9L 
NOTPMY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
SprlsitjtAllfi uiA/l 
APPENDIX C 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
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RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Gordon Dean Hamilton's sons, Stuart and Vincent Hamilton, 
appeal the trial court's final judgment awarding Mary Hamilton, 
Gordon Hamilton's widow, a life estate in the marital home 
subject to certain conditions, $4000 in cash, $43,394 in personal 
property, and a family allowance of $1000 per month for twenty-
four months. Stuart and Vincent Hamilton further appeal the 
trial court's denial of their claim that Mary Hamilton be 
required to pay her pro rata portion of the inheritance taxes. 
We affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part. 
1. Judge Russon authored this opinion prior to his appointment 
to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Finally, section VII states: 
All real and personal property owned by 
either of the parties at the time of their 
marriage, and all real and personal property 
that either may acquire from any source 
whatsoever during their marriage, shall be 
their respective separate property, except if 
unless specifically otherwise designated at 
the time of acquisition thereof, or other 
individual separate agreement of the parties. 
During the marriage, Gordon Hamilton purchased numerous 
items of personal property both personally and through Hamilton 
Brothers Electric, Inc. 
On December 7, 1989, Gordon Hamilton executed his last will, 
ratifying therein the antenuptial agreement. Paragraph 3 of the 
will states, in part: "It is my intent to leave a life estate to 
my wife Mary M. Hamilton in the residence we have in Springville, 
Utah. * Paragraph 4 grants his children any rights he has in his 
mariral home "subject to a life estate my wife Mary M. Hamilton 
who [sic] shall have unless she remarries." However, the will 
makes no mention of joint tenancy in personal property to Mary 
Hamilton. Further, paragraph 5.1 of the will provides that: 
My unsecured debts, secured debts, 
administration expenses, funeral expenses, 
and all federal and state estate and 
inheritance taxes shall be paid out of my 
residuary estate. . . . Provided further, it 
is my intention that all nonprobate property 
creating a federal or state estate or 
inheritance tax burden upon my estate will 
share proportionately with my residuary 
estate the respective burden of such taxes. 
Therefore, I direct that any of the 
hereinbefore described taxes payable by 
reason of the taxability of any gifts in 
contemplation of death, retained life 
estates, transfers taking effect at death, 
revocable transfers, annuities, joint 
tenancies, powers of appointment, life 
insurance proceeds, or other nonprobate 
assets shall be paid by the recipient of such 
assets and that any of such taxes payable 
because of the taxability of any part of my 
residuary estate shall be paid out of my 
residuary estate, subject to two exceptions: 
(1) The recipients of life insurance proceeds 
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Hamilton a life estate subject to certain conditions. 
Specifically, they assert that since the will contains no clear 
and unequivocal granting language, Mary Hamilton is not entitled 
to any interest in the marital home. Mary Hamilton responds that 
the language of the will supports the trial court's finding that 
she is entitled to a life estate in the home, subject to certain 
conditions, and therefore, the trial court did not err in so 
finding. 
In construing a will, we are bound by the fundamental 
principle that "a court must look to the testator's intent as 
expressed in the will." Estate of Ashton v. Ashton, 804 P. 2d 
540, 542 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-603 
(1978); In re Estate of Gardner. 615 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Utah 
1980.)). Moreover, if the will is ambiguous, any rule of 
construction normally used in other writings must yield to the 
intention of the testator as revealed in the instrument. In re 
Johnsons Estate. 64 Utah 114, 117, 228 P. 748, 749 (1924); In re 
Poppleton's Estate. 34 Utah 285, 293, 97 P. 138, 140 (1908), The 
factual issue of the decedent,s intent is one we review with 
deference to the trial court's findings, if adequate, and we 
reverse only upon a finding of clear error. Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a); In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
In order to show clear error, the appellant "must marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking 
in support as to be xagainst the clear weight of the evidence,' 
thus making them ^clearly erroneous.'" Bartell. 776 P.2d at 886 
(quoting State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
A testator's intent may be "* ascertained not alone from the 
provision itself, but from a scrutiny of the entire instrument of 
which it is a part, and in the light of the conditions and 
circumstances in which the instrument came into existence.'11 
Poppleton. 34 Utah at 294, 97 P. at 140 (quoting Adams v. First 
Baptist Church. 148 Mich. 140, 111 N.W. 757, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
509, 515 (1907)); accord Gardner. 615 P.2d at 1217; Ashton. 804 
P.2d at 542. Thus, extrinsic evidence may be used to ascertain 
what the testator intended. 
In the case at bar, Gordon Hamilton's intent is plainly 
revealed in the language of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the will. 
Paragraph 3 provides: "It is my intent to leave a life estate to 
my wife Mary M. Hamilton in the residence we have in Springville, 
Utah." Paragraph 4 states that his children's rights to the 
marital home are "subject to a life estate my wife Mary M. 
Hamilton who [sic] shall have unless she remarries." 
Additionally, the language of section IV of the antenuptial 
agreement states: "In the event, however, that Gordon 
predeceases Mary, it is the intent of the parties that she be 
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However, "*sanct ms for frivolous appeals should only be 
applied in egregious uases, lest there be an improper chilling of 
the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions.'" Hinckley 
v. Hinc^py. 815 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Porco 
v. Pore 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988)). "Egregious cases 
may inc ..e those obviously v :hout merit, with no reasonable 
likelihood of success, and wh-jh result in the delay of a proper 
judgment," Mauahan v. Mauahan. 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 
1989) ( ting Porco. 752 P.2d at 369). While we hold in favor of 
Mary Hamilton on this issue, we are unable to say that Stuart and 
Vincent Hamilton's appeal was obviously without merit or filed 
merely for the purpose of delay. Accordingly, we decline to 
award Rule 33 sanctions on this issue. 
JOINT TENANCY 
Stuart and Vincent Hamilton assail the trial court's finding 
that Mary Hamilton was entitled to a joint tenancy interest in 
the marital home's furnishings, asserting that there is no 
indication in the will or in the antenuptial agreement of the 
creation of-a joint tenancy in the personal property of the home. 
Mary Hamilton concedes that the trial court's finding is not 
supported by the evidence, but argues that: (1) since she and 
Gordon Hamilton gave the four bronzes as a gift to each other, 
the trial court's finding as to the four bronzes is supported by 
the evidence and should be affirmed; and (2) as to the other 
property in question, this court should modify the trial court's 
ruling to provide her with a life estate in the marital home's 
furnishings. 
A trial court's findings of fact are not to be disturbed 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Utah R. Giv. P. 52(a). 
"Under this standard, we do not set aside the trial court's 
factual findings unless they are against the great weight of the 
evidence or we otherwise reach a firm and definite conviction 
that a mistake has been made." Southland Corn, v. Potter, 7 60 
P.2d 320, 321 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Western Kane County Spec, 
Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 
(Utah 1987)). Moreover, it is the responsibility of the party 
challenging a finding of fact to marshal the evidence suppor; ng 
that finding and demonstrate that such finding is clearly 
erroneous. In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1989). 
As to the four bronzes, both Mary Hamilton and the 
Hamiltons' neighbors, Richard and Sandra Tretheway, testified 
that Gordon and Mary Hamilton had given the four bronzes to ~ch 
other as a Christmas gift, and Stuart and Vincent Hamilton h.ve 
failed to marshal any evidence to the contrary. Thus, we must 
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month for twenty-four months following Gordon Hamilton's death. 
Mary Hamilton responds that the evidence before the trial court 
supports its award of a family allowance, and thus, such award 
should be affirmed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-403(1) (1993) provides, in pertinent 
part: 
In addition to the right to homestead 
allowance and exempt property, if the 
decedent was domiciled in this state, the 
surviving spouse and minor children whom the 
decedent was obligated to support and 
children who were in fact being supported by 
him are entitled to a reasonable allowance in 
money out of the estate for their maintenance 
during the period of administration. 
In other words, section 75-2-403(1) entitles a surviving spouse 
to an allowance for his or her maintenance during the period of 
administration of the will. 
However, such an allowance is not an absolute right. In re 
Bundv's Estate, 121 Utah 299, 304, 241 P.2d 462, 464 (1952). The 
trial court may, in its discretion, determine whether a family 
allowance is needed on the basis of the specific facts in the 
case before it. See id. The factors to be used in determining 
the amount of the family allowance during administration include 
the age of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse's health, 
the surviving spouse's previous standard of living, the value of 
the estate, and the value and nature of the surviving spouse's 
own separate property. Jd. Thus, we review the trial court's 
award of a family allowance to Mary Hamilton under the facts of 
this case for an abuse of discretion. 
In the case at bar, the trial court made the following 
findings of fact, which the parties do not dispute on appeal: 
(1) Mary Hamilton's net worth as of the date of Gordon Hamilton's 
death was $2215; (2) After Gordon Hamilton's death, Mary Hamilton 
received $50,000 in life insurance proceeds, $23,353 in pension 
benefits, and a $10,000 insurance settlement; (3) At the time of 
trial, Gordon Hamilton's estate was valued at $1,681,745; 
(4) During Mary and Gordon Hamilton's marriage, they traveled 
extensively and enjoyed "a handsome lifestyle11; (5) Following 
Gordon Hamilton's death, Mary Hamilton's claimed living expenses 
were approximately $2382 per month, which were not unreasonable 
in light of the lifestyle that the Hamiltons had previously 
enjoyed; (6) Mary Hamilton has disposable income of approximately 
$1300 per month from her employment with Hamilton Brothers 
Electric, Inc; and (7) "[I]n order to obviate the necessity of 
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and all federal and state estate and 
inheritance taxes shall be paid out of mv 
residuary estate, . - . (2) None of the 
hereinbefore described taxes shall be borne 
bv mv wife with respect to any probate or 
nonprobate assets passing to her and 
qualifying for the federal estate tax marital 
deduction. 
Not only does this section of the will fail to clearly and 
specifically order division of inheritance taxes contrary to 
section 75-3-916, but it clearly and specifically supports that 
section's imposition of taxes on the corpus of the estate. This 
is especially true in light of Gordon Hamilton's apparent intent 
in section 5.1(2) to keep Mary Hamilton from having to pay 
inheritance taxes. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court 
correctly determined that Mary Hamilton did not owe a pro rata 
share of inheritance taxes. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly awarded Mary Hamilton (1) a life 
estate in the marital home subject to certain conditions, (2) a 
joint tenancy interest in the four bronzes, and (3) a family 
allowance under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-403(1) (1993). Moreover, 
it correctly determined that Mary Hamilton did not owe a pro rata 
portion of the inheritance taxes. Accordingly, as to these 
issues, the trial court's final judgment is affirmed. We vacate 
and remand the trial court's joint tenancy determination as to 
the remainder of the marital home's furnishings for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Leonard H. Russon, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE^CONCUR 
m 3l£&f4J 
Judith^M? B i l l i n g s , Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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